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Abstract—The necessary energy transition to decarbonize power 
systems is leading to increasingly important challenges for the 
operation of power systems. On the one hand, the intermittent 
nature of renewable generation requires system operators to 
procure ancillary services in larger volumes than in the past. On 
the other, the growing penetration of medium- and small-scale, 
flexible demand and storage systems in distribution networks 
could potentially offer network services, if they are aggregated 
effectively and there is an appropriate coordination between 
transmission system operators (TSOs), distribution system 
operators (DSOs) and aggregators. Therefore, an important 
topic to be analysed is whether distributed energy resources 
(DER) can replace traditional generation in the provision of 
ancillary services (AS), how this replacement will affect the 
system operators’ roles and how to improve the coordination 
between TSOs and DSOs. This paper shows the results of the 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) performed within the project 
SmartNet to assess the advantages or disadvantages of different 
TSO-DSO coordination schemes, as well as the follow-up 
activities to be carried out in the project CoordiNet. 
Index Terms—CBA, TSO, DSO, Flexibility, Coordination. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The replacement of fossil-fuel-based generation by 
renewable generation is leading to increasingly important 
challenges in terms of frequency stability, congestion 
management, voltage regulation and power quality, due to the 
variable behaviour of renewables. At the same time, there is a 
growing penetration of medium and small-scale, flexible 
demand and storage systems in distribution networks. These 
resources could provide network services if they are 
aggregated effectively and if there is an appropriate 
coordination between TSOs, DSOs and aggregators. 
For this reason, it is interesting to analyse to which extent 
DERs can replace traditional generation in the services 
provision to network operators. The participation of these 
distributed resources in the AS markets will require a change 
in the roles of the distribution companies, as well as greater 
cooperation and coordination between them and the TSOs. 
The European Union itself recognized this need for updating 
roles (Article 32, [1]), by giving to the DSO responsibilities in 
terms of congestion management, enabling also the possibility 
of establishing dedicated market mechanisms to acquire the 
necessary flexibility (but not to balance the system frequency, 
whose management remains in the TSO’s hand). 
II. FLEXIBILITY MARKETS SIMULATED 
Different TSO-DSO coordination schemes (CSs) and real-
time market architectures were compared in the project 
SmartNet (http://smartnet-project.eu/) to find out which one 
could deliver the best compromise between costs and benefits 
for the system (similar work performed in [2], [3]): 
1) Centralised AS market model (CS A): The TSO can 
contract AS directly with DER owners connected to the DSO 
grid. The DSO can procure and use DER to solve local grid 
issues, but not in this real-time centralised AS market. 
2) Local AS market model (CS B): The DSO, via a local 
market, procures flexibility for solving local problems and, 
then, an aggregation of the remaining resources is transferred 
to the TSO, so that the TSO can contract DER only indirectly. 
3) Shared balancing responsibility model (CS C): The 
TSO transfers balancing responsibility to the DSO. The DSO 
has to respect a pre-defined schedule at the TSO-DSO 
interface by using local DER (obtained via a local market) to 
fulfil its balancing responsibilities. 
4) Common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS D): TSOs 
and DSOs contract DER in a common flexibility market to 
minimise total activation costs of flexibilities contracted. 
 
  
In order to compare which of these CSs provides a better 
compromise between costs and benefits, an ad-hoc platform 
was developed [4] to carry out simulations and evaluate the 
implementation of TSO-DSO interaction schemes, under 
plausible 2030 energy scenarios for three European regions 
(Northern Italy, Continental Denmark and the peninsular 
system of Spain), whose characteristics are reported below: 
• Italy and Spain are expected to face a significant increase 
of photovoltaic (PV) and wind generation, which will be 
comparable to the total power capacity of conventional 
power plants. This renewable generation will be located 
mostly at distribution level. 
• Thanks to the spread of electric vehicles, storage-based 
technologies are expected to have a significant potential 
in all the considered regions. 
• Flexible thermal loads will shyly increase in all the 
scenarios, except in Denmark, where they will represent a 
significant portion of the available flexibility, as 
controllable heat pumps are expected to replace large 
combined heat and power (CHP) units by 2030. 
III. SIMULATION PLATFORM 
The flexibility market considered in the SmartNet project, 
“Integrated Reserve Market”, was aimed at solving real-time 
imbalances and congestions between gate closure of intraday 
markets and real time until the opening of the next intraday 
market session [5]. The market horizon can vary as a function 
of the market requirements, but in general it would last from 
15 minutes to 1 hour. 
The simulation environment was divided into three main 
layers, which are further detailed in [4], [6] and [7]: 
1) The market layer integrates the market clearing 
algorithms, which process the bids proposed by the different 
market players and returns the optimal activations aimed at 
restoring the system balance and solving/avoiding network 
congestions. 
2) In the bidding and dispatching layer, the bids that 
different agents (both traditional producers and retailers, as 
well as aggregators representing numerous flexible resources 
connected in distribution) send to the market layer are 
created. Market players use different algorithms to process 
the available flexibility of energy resources into bids and to 
translate market results into activations. More details about 
this process can be found in [8]. 
3) The physical layer simulates the physical processes of 
the electrical network (transmission and distribution) as well 
as of the generation, consumption and storage equipment 
connected to it. Hence, it simulates the effects of the 
activations on transmission and distribution networks, 
including the physics of each (flexible and non-flexible) 
device connected to them. 
Three scenarios were created for each of the regions 
described above, representing three typical days, with different 
demand (wet appliances, thermostatically controlled loads and 
sheddable loads), solar irradiation and wind conditions.  
IV. CBA 
A CBA was performed to identify the coordination scheme 
with the highest performance [9], [10]. With this purpose, the 
following metrics were selected and converted into monetary 
units: 
1) Total mFRR cost: This indicator includes the total 
balancing cost of the market defined in SmartNet. The energy 
activated is remunerated at the nodal price resulting from the 
market clearing process. The mFRR activations are aimed to 
solve the network imbalance and to avoid congestions 
predicted in advance for the next time step. 
2) Total aFRR cost: This is the cost of re-balancing the 
system after the mFRR market. In this case, an off-line aFRR 
market is simulated in order to optimally select the resources 
and the price for this reserve. 
3) Unwanted measures (UM): Each coordination scheme 
requires a different market setup and a different level of detail 
for the grid model to be used in the market clearing process, 
which aims to solve and avoid congestion issues in the 
network. Some simplifications, required to allow for a faster 
execution of the market clearing algorithm, together with 
forecasting uncertainty, may create infeasibilities when 
dispatching the units cleared in the market. Hence, some bids 
accepted in the market clearing may create congestions that 
are not identified by the grid model used. In this case, grid 
operators must take emergency actions to re-dispatch some 
resources aiming to solve real congestions in the grid. Since it 
is assumed that re-dispatched resources are remunerated 
according to their actual cost for reaching the requested set-
point and the real unit cost are used to create the bids for the 
mFRR market, the UM are monetised at the mFRR bid price. 
4) Information and communication technologies (ICT) 
costs: Since all investigated CSs feature very similar 
communication system requirements to monitor and operate 
DER, the cost estimation focused on the software 
development effort for the realization of aggregation and 
market optimization routines. It was assumed that Centralised 
AS market model (CS A) is a natural evolution of the current 
coordination and, hence, that it will be operational in 2030. 
For this reason, the investigation evaluates costs to upgrade 
from CS A to alternative schemes by calculating IT system 
development and upgrade costs. No indirect costs, e.g. 
increase of grid monitoring, are considered.  
In addition to these metrics, the CO2 emissions were also 
calculated as a complementary metric for informative 
purposes. Since the cost of the CO2 emissions was already 
included in the bids sent by the aggregators to the mFRR 
market, this metric was not monetised. 
For each of the simulated typical days, the total cost of 
each CS is the addition of the four metrics previously 
mentioned. Then, the total annual costs are obtained by 
estimating the number of occurrences of each typical day, 
based on the real conditions in 2018. 
  
V. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Next figures show the results obtained for each country in 
the four coordination schemes considered. 
As Figure 1 shows, CS A is the cheapest CS in Denmark 
and CS C the most expensive one. The amount of mFRR 
energy managed in each CS (which is definitively larger that 
the aFRR one) is the cost driver in the simulated scenario. 
Since the scenario considered infrequent distribution 
congestions, the results for CS A, CS B and CS D are very 
similar, and the main difference is caused by the ICT costs. 
 
Figure 1: Annual costs in the Danish scenario 
mFRR costs, which are very similar for all CSs, represent 
also the main CBA component in Italy, as shown in Figure 2. 
The main difference between the CSs is determined by the 
aFRR cost. In the scenarios considered, the most efficient CSs 
are the CS B and CS D, although the costs for all CSs are very 
similar. The large activated volumes of frequency restoration 
reserves make the UM and ICT costs practically negligible. 
 
Figure 2: Annual costs in the Italian scenario 
In the Spanish case, Figure 3, the CBA results of CS A, 
CS B and CS D are very similar, while the CS C results to be 
the most expensive. The impact of ICT and UM is negligible 
with respect to the rest of costs. Being the total costs of CS A, 
CS B and CS D comparable and the mFRR costs very similar 
in all CSs, the difference between these CSs is determined by 
the weight that the terms aFRR, UM and ICT have on the total 
amount. The inefficiency of CS C is determined by the aFRR 
contribution. 
 
Figure 3: Annual costs in the Spanish scenario 
The CO2 emissions have not been monetized, since the 
bids sent by aggregators already include a cost for the CO2 
ton, but they have been calculated and reported in Figure 4 
(note that the scale is adapted for an easier comparison). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Annual CO2 emissions in the three national scenarios 
  
The effectiveness of the TSO-DSO coordination schemes 
depends on the level of services requested by the DSO: 
• In case of few congestions at distribution level 
(forecasting errors are comparable to the possibility 
of having congestions in distribution grid), CS A 
(centralized CS) has higher economic performance 
than other options. This is the case of Denmark, 
where the contribution of wind power (located on 
transmission network) is higher than the contribution 
from PV and, thus, forecasting errors are expected to 
be higher, while the congestions at distribution level 
are likely to be less frequent. 
• When distribution congestions are significant (and 
predictable), the adoption of common (CS D) or local 
markets (CS B) results to be beneficial. This is the 
case in Italy, where generation located in distribution 
grids, such as PV, contributes more to the electricity 
mix and, hence, congestions are expected to happen 
more frequently. 
• In any case, the most relevant cost component is 
mFRR in all the cases, while UM and ICT costs 
account for only a small share. 
The implementation of two-step markets (CS B and CS C) 
is generally less efficient than optimising in a single step: 
• Regarding CS B, the results are similar to the ones 
returned by CS D, although slightly more expensive 
in the scenarios simulated. This effect was quite 
expected since CS B optimises in two separated steps 
and sub-optimum solutions are likely to be obtained. 
• The shared balancing responsibility model (CS C) is 
clearly the least efficient CS in all the countries. In 
addition to optimising in two steps, it introduces an 
additional constraint by fixing the active power 
exchange at the TSO-DSO interconnection, which 
further takes the solution away from the absolute 
optimum obtained in CS D.  
• Both CS B and CS C may suffer from scarcity and/or 
illiquidity of resources, which would further decrease 
their efficiency.  
• Yet, in rare circumstances (i.e. severe congestions at 
transmission level) two-step market architectures can 
be more beneficial than other schemes, as market 
separation may prevent the spreading of high nodal 
prices among distribution and transmission systems. 
Under the scope restrictions and the formulation of the ICT 
cost estimation problem, the main finding was that ICT costs 
are much lower than the operational costs in the different 
market arrangements and that their impact in the scoring of 
CSs is almost negligible (and subject to uncertainties). The 
aggregators will bear a large portion of these ICT costs 
(communications with DERs, aggregation software, etc.) and 
the issue of the last kilometre DER communications must be 
solved. However, this does not affect the scoring of the CSs, 
since a similar communication cost is expected for all CSs. 
Some country-specific deductions can also be extracted: 
• In Italy, where congestions at distribution level are 
noticeable, the upgrade from CS A to CS B/D is 
convenient and not jeopardized by ICT costs. 
• In Spain, with average congestions at distribution 
level, ICT costs are comparable to the benefits of 
adopting CS B/D rather than maintaining CS A. 
• In Denmark, with low congestions at distribution 
level and high forecasting errors, the implementation 
of all CSs with DSO services failed.  
The CO2 emissions in Italy are one order of magnitude 
higher than in the other two countries, because each country 
has a different energy mix in the scenarios considered. 
However, all CSs feature similar CO2 emissions with less than 
7% of difference. The main reason is that mFRR activations 
are small if compared to the total energy demand (and even 
more the aFRR and UM activations), so the efficiency in 
TSO-DSO coordination does not have a big impact in the 
overall CO2 emissions. In the specific case of CS C, the sub-
optimal mFRR activations drive to more visible impacts on 
CO2, except when forecasting errors are comparable to the 
probability of having congestions in distribution (Denmark), 
as CS C becomes more efficient in terms of CO2 emission too. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the outcomes obtained during the project, and 
considering the scenarios analysed within it, the adoption of 
CS C results to be the least efficient CS in all the countries 
and, therefore, technical reasons could advise to continue 
centralizing balancing responsibility to TSOs. However, 
depending on the impact of the congestions at distribution 
level, the congestion management responsibility could be 
shared between TSOs and DSOs: 
• Traditional TSO-centric schemes could stay optimal 
if distribution networks do not show significant 
congestions, which is likely in the very near-future 
scenarios where the distribution grid planning 
continues affected by the fit-and-forget reinforcement 
policy. However, this regulatory trend may soon be 
modified, so that the DSOs’ remuneration will give 
more importance to their investments in intelligence 
(OPEX) rather than in grid elements (CAPEX). Then, 
a more advanced coordination between TSO-DSO, 
like the proposed CS B or CS D, should be deployed 
for a more efficient management of the system. 
• More advanced centralized schemes incorporating 
distribution constraints (CS D) show higher economic 
performances, but their performance could be 
undermined by big forecasting errors. Hence, it is of 
paramount importance to improve the forecasting 
techniques, to increase the market clearing frequency 
and to shift the gate closure as much as possible 
towards real-time. 
• The two-step optimization process implies that the 
decentralized schemes are less efficient than single-
step processes. Scarcity of liquidity and potential 
impact of local market power (not investigated in 
SmartNet), along with extra constraints introduced to 
  
avoid counteracting actions between local congestion 
market and balancing market (e.g. increasing the 
system imbalance while solving local congestions), 
have an additional negative impact in the economic 
efficiency of decentralized schemes. The effect is 
especially important in CS C, where added 
constraints (e. g. imposing flow at the TSO-DSO 
interface in CS C) further decrease the CS efficiency. 
• The local congestion markets should have a 
“reasonable” size and guarantee a free competition by 
a sufficient number of actors, in order to prevent 
scarcity of liquidity and the power exercise by the 
local markets. This may require that small DSOs 
pool-up in order to ensure the required market size. 
• CS D has apparent advantages over the rest of CSs in 
the more than likely mid-term scenario in which the 
fit-and-forget reinforcement remuneration approach is 
abandoned and the forecasting errors are more 
accurately calculated. Yet, the network observability 
cannot be pushed till single low-voltage nodes due to 
complexity reasons. As a result, the observability 
level to be deployed for each specific case and 
country must be determined, taking into account that 
increasing the observability of distribution grids 
implies new important investments by the system. 
• Once the most advisable CS at system-level is 
selected, a business-level analysis is needed to assess 
the economic impact of the different CSs for all the 
relevant actors in order to guarantee that all the 
involved participants have a profitable business case. 
The appropriate allocation of costs and benefits 
among the actors is of utmost importance when 
selecting the CS, since this issue may strengthen or 
threaten the deployment of the proposed CS. 
VII. FOLLOW-UP: COORDINET PROJECT 
The work performed in SmartNet is being continued in the 
project CoordiNet (https://coordinet-project.eu/). CoordiNet 
aims to demonstrate how DSOs and TSOs shall coordinate to 
procure grid services in the most reliable and efficient way 
through the implementation of large scale “TSO-DSO-
Consumer” demonstration projects. 
It is intended to demonstrate how the TSO (responsible for 
ensuring the balance of the power system in its control area 
and managing the very high voltage transmission grid) and the 
DSOs (managers of the high-, medium- and low-voltage 
distribution grids), can act in a coordinated way, to purchase 
and activate grid services, promote the cooperation of all 
actors and remove the barriers for customers to have an active 
market participation. In that sense, three large-scale demo 
projects are being implemented in Spain, Sweden, Greece, 
consisting of ten demonstration pilots (four in Spain, four in 
Sweden and two in Greece) and representing various boundary 
grid, climatic, load and generation conditions. For that 
purpose, one of its main aims is to define or adapt, 
demonstrate and promote future standardized grid services and 
related market platforms to enable a seamless pan-European 
electricity market. 
As a first step, the flexibility requirements by TSOs and 
DSOs have been analysed. From this analysis, some flexibility 
products and services have been identified. These products 
and services are expected to be used across Europe and, thus, 
they will be demonstrated in the different pilots. Moreover, the 
coordination schemes defined in SmartNet have been adapted 
to further clarify the roles of both TSOs and DSOs. 
With all this information, each demonstration pilot has 
defined the business use cases to be deployed at each site. 
Those business use cases will be the basis for the economic 
assessment to be performed within CoordiNet. The impact of 
the use of new products and services with the refined 
coordination schemes will be evaluated in the three demo 
countries, in order to determine the advantages for the overall 
power system. This analysis is in line with the one performed 
in SmartNet, but the scope is extended. 
Then, the business use cases defined by the demonstration 
pilots will be assessed, to see under which conditions all the 
stakeholders in the value chain can have a positive outcome, 
that is whether the costs and benefits of deploying these 
coordination schemes, products and services are properly 
allocated among them. 
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